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IRONIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
SANFORD

N.

GREENBERG*

The contributions to this Symposium by Professors Nicholas S.
Zeppos and Thomas W. Merrill examine administrative law through
different lenses. Professor Zeppos critically examines sociological,

economic, and jurisprudential theories that purport to explain why
"the elite bar" opposed the rise of the administrative state, focusing
on the period leading up to enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 1 Professor Merrill focuses on judicial reaction to
the administrative state and offers an intellectual history of those reac-

tions in the era after the enactment of the APA. 2 He divides that era
into three periods. The first (1946-1966) was characterized by a rather
optimistic "public interest" conception of the role of agencies. 3 The
second (1967-1983) was marked by the belief that judicial oversight
4
could help fight "capture" of agencies by narrow interest groups.

And the third (1983-present) reflects at least a family resemblance to
"public choice" theory, which is pessimistic about all public institutions, whether legislative, executive, or judicial.5 Reading these two
intriguing pieces in tandem suggests that the "stunning ironies ' 6 with

which Professor Zeppos begins his article are not the only ironies that
mark the history of modern administrative law.

According to the accounts that Professor Zeppos analyzes, elite
attorneys resisted the rise of the administrative state because that rise
appeared to threaten the epistemological and institutional underpin* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law and Acting Director, Ilana Diamond Rovner Program in Appellate Advocacy, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology;
A.B. 1970, Princeton University; M.A. 1971 and Ph.D. 1978, University of California, Berkeley;
J.D. 1990, George Washington University National Law Center. I wish to thank Hal Krent for
reviewing an earlier draft; Spencer Simons of Chicago-Kent's Information Center for helping
obtain sources; and my wife, Elizabeth Seaver Perdue, for providing editorial suggestions and
encouragement.
1. Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal Profession and the Development of Administrative Law,
72 CHI.-KErrr L. REV. 1119 (1997).

2. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1039 (1997).
3. Id. at 1048-50.
4. Id. at 1050-52.
5. Id. at 1053-55.
6. Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1119.
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nings of their professional influence as adjuncts to the courts. 7 This
influence presumably required both a central role for common law8
courts and a sharp distinction between "objective" law and politics.
Although there is relatively little overlap in the chronological coverage of these two articles, Professor Merrill agrees with Professor Zeppos that the elite bar resisted the growth of the administrative state. 9

Indeed, he contends that such resistance continued in some measure
after the APA was enacted. 10

One might expect even greater resistance to administrative government from the judiciary than from the elite bar. The prestige and
power of judges would seem more directly threatened by the rise of
quasi-political agencies that often made policy without the traditional

procedures of common law courts. Yet Professor Merrill claims that
in the first two decades of the APA era, judicial support for-or at
least acceptance of-the administrative state actually was greater than
it would be in later periods.1" This rapid acceptance of the modern
administrative state by federal judges is an irony that calls out for fur12
ther explanation.
Professor Merrill attributes the judiciary's initially favorable atti-

tude to the post-APA administrative state in part to the role of New
Deal insiders. He notes that "[tihe Supreme Court was itself heavily
populated with former New Deal lawyers, including Justices Frank'1 3
furter, Jackson, Reed, Murphy, Douglas, Goldberg, and Fortas.
However, Justices Goldberg and Fortas joined the Court only in the

1960s,14 toward the end of Professor Merrill's first period. Their ten7. See id. at 1121-24. Although Professor Zeppos raises some important questions about
"the conventional account," he acknowledges that it offers "at least a partial explanation for how
lawyers shaped the [APA] and the structure of administrative law." Id. at 1121.
8. Id. at 1122, 1129.
9. Merrill, supra note 2, at 1048.
10. Id.
11. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
12. As Professor Zeppos points out, one actually could trace the origins of the administrative state to the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the late nineteenth century.
See Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1131. With that starting point in mind, it arguably is an exaggeration to describe the judiciary's acceptance of the administrative state as "rapid." Nonetheless, it
still seems ironic that the courts adjusted more rapidly than the elite bar to the expansion of the
administrative state in the twentieth century. Cf Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four
Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559, 567 (1997) (contending that even the allegedly conservative
members of the early New Deal Court (Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and
Butler) "upheld a vast array of national regulatory incursions" and "voted to uphold more Interstate Commerce Commission ...orders than you can shake a stick at").
13. Merrill, supra note 2, at 1059.
14. Justice Arthur Goldberg served from 1962 to 1965, and Justice Abe Fortas, from 1965 to
1969. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 861-62 (1979)
[hereinafter CQ GUIDE].
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ure thus does not explain the initial reaction in the APA era. Of the
other "New Deal lawyers" cited by Professor Merrill, only Justices
Stanley Reed, William Douglas, and Robert Jackson had significant
New Deal administrative agency experience outside the Justice Department. 15 Justice Reed had served as general counsel to both the

Federal Farm Board under President Hoover and the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation under President Roosevelt before becoming
FDR's solicitor general in 1935.16 Justice Douglas first served the
New Deal in 1934 as a staff member of the Securities and Exchange

Commission ("SEC") while on leave from his teaching position at

Yale Law School. 17 He later became an SEC commissioner in 1936
and served as chairman of the SEC from 1937 until his appointment to
the Court in 1939.18 And, prior to being named to the Court, Justice
Jackson held a number of administrative positions, including general
counsel to the Internal Revenue Service, special counsel to the SEC,
solicitor general, and attorney general. 19
15. Justice Felix Frankfurter did have some administrative experience during World War I,
but prior to his appointment to the Court in 1939, the Harvard Law School professor served
President Roosevelt only as an informal adviser. See id. at 851. Justice Francis Murphy served
as governor general and later United States high commissioner in the Philippines and as attorney
general before his 1940 appointment. See id. at 852.
President Roosevelt's other appointees to the Supreme Court were Hugo Black, James
Byrnes, and Wiley Rutledge. Justice Black had served as Senator from Alabama, and his Senate
career included investigations into "abuses of marine and airline subsidies and the activities of
lobbying groups." Id. at 849. Justice Byrnes had served in the House and Senate before his brief
Court tenure, and his New Deal administrative experience came only after he resigned from the
Court during World War II. See id. at 853. Justice Rutledge had served as a law school professor
and dean and as a D.C. Circuit Judge prior to being elevated to the Supreme Court. See id. at
854-55.
Of the other Justices appointed to the Court between 1945 and 1965, only Chief Justice
Vinson had significant New Deal administrative experience outside the Justice Department. See
id. at 855-62.
16. See id. at 850. For additional background on Justice Reed's administrative experience,
see JOHN D. FASSETr, NEW DEAL JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF STANLEY REED OF KENTUCKY 31-195
(1994).
17. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS 257 (1974)
[hereinafter DOUGLAS, Go EAST].
18. See id. at 262, 314; CQ GUIDE, supra note 14, at 851-52.
19. See CQ GUIDE, supra note 14, at 854. Both Justice Jackson and Justice Murphy, during
their tenures as attorney general, played a role in the studies that helped lead to the enactment
of the APA. See COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE: ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. DOC. No. 77-8, at 1 (1st Sess. 1941); see also Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 39-41 (1950) (discussing the background to the APA). Commenting on
the 1941 report, Justice Frankfurter observed that "[t]he time has come ... for us to give full
acceptance to Administrative Law as an honorable and indispensable member of our legal
household, instead of continuing to treat it as though it were a subverter." Felix Frankfurter,
Foreword-The Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,
41 COLUM. L. REV. 585, 586-87 (1941).
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Justice Reed perhaps best illustrates Professor Merrill's point that

judicial acceptance of the rise of the administrative state can in part be
explained by the experiences of New Deal lawyers who became

judges. Even before he was named to the Court, Reed was recognized
as "'an important legal aide in forwarding and defending the policies
of the New Deal'"20 In his tenure as solicitor general, Reed argued
21
before the Court a number of the early important New Deal cases.
Reed-and the Roosevelt Administration-suffered embarrassing
losses in some of these cases. 22 Reed's experiences working for two
federal agencies and arguing before a Court that was hostile to the
New Deal's experiments in social welfare and economic regulation

possibly contributed to his opposition to "krytocracy-government by
judges."'23 Whatever the reasons for his judicial self-restraint, "Mr.
Justice Reed... believed that substantial deference should be given to
the judgment of the Executive or of federal agencies where Congress
had chosen to rely on their expertise and discretion to implement stat'24
utory policy."

But perhaps other New-Deal-lawyers-turned-Justices, rather than
being advocates of the administrative state because of their personal

experiences, entered the Court skeptical of unchecked administrative
power. 25 Such skepticism characterized at least Justice Douglas.
While he viewed his own agency's early activities as relatively immune
from improper private influences,2 6 Justice Douglas's memoirs are flled with warnings about regulatory capture. 27 Some of the warnings
20. FASSE'r, supra note 16, at 84 (quoting N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 1935, at 9).
21. See, e.g., id. at 88-90 (discussing Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935);
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
22. See, e.g., id. at 194-95, 214.
23. Id. at x.
24. Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti, Proceedingsin the Supreme Court of the United
States in Memory of Justice Reed, 449 U.S. xxxvii, lii (Dec. 15, 1980). For examples of Justice
Reed's deference in the administrative law context, see Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33, 53-55 (1950) (Reed, J., dissenting) and Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411-12 (1941).
25. Professor Merrill himself notes that some New Deal insiders eventually became disillusioned with the administrative state, but he traces this disillusionment to a later period. Merrill,
supra note 2, at 1051.
26. See, e.g., DOLAS, Go EAST, supra note 17, at 266-68, 295.
27. See, e.g., id. at 294 ("After experience with administrative agencies at the federal level,
it seemed to me that most agencies become so closely identified with the interests they are
supposed to regulate, eventually they are transformed into spokesmen for the interest groups.");
WILLIAM

0.

DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS:

1939-1975, at 166-67 (1980) [hereinafter

DOUGLAS,

("By the 1960s and 1970s the corporation dominated American life. Its
lobbies ran Washington, D.C., the power behind almost all of the federal agencies. Federal
agencies had been entrusted by Congress with carrying policies into practice that were consistent
with the 'public interest.' In practical effect, 'public interest' became impregnated with 'corporate interest'; the agencies, not viciously and corruptly, but nonetheless effectively, became vehicles whereby the corporate lobbies dictated or influenced agency policies.")
THE COURT YEARS]
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reflected lessons that could have been learned after the New Deal,
perhaps during Professor Merrill's second period.2 8 Other comments,
however, suggest that even during the New Deal, Justice Douglas was
wary of the influence that regulated parties could have over federal
agencies. For example, he contended in his memoirs that during the
New Deal, one agency "had long been a disgrace, pretty much the tool
of cattle and sheep barons. ' 29 He also reported having told President
Roosevelt that the vital steel industry had to be controlled by the federal government but that "regulation" would not work because "steel
would soon run the regulators. '30 And he apparently opposed FDR's
experiment in corporate self-regulation, the National Industrial Re31
covery Act ("NIRA").
Justice Douglas's judicial opinions during the 1940s and 1950s
also sometimes reflected distrust of private power and unchecked administrative discretion. For example, in his dissent from a decision
that approved the Interstate Commerce Commission's permitting a
railroad subsidiary to transport freight by truck, Justice Douglas observed that "the present decision allows the Commission to construe
the statute as if 'railroad convenience and necessity' rather than 'public convenience and necessity' were the standard. '32 In another case,
he protested the Court's approval of a rate reduction ordered by the
Federal Power Commission ("FPC") because the FPC had endorsed
an alleged "unholy alliance" 33 between two utilities in violation of the
Sherman Act: "It is far better that one public utility win one more
legal skirmish in its struggle against regulation, than that we abandon
'34
legal standards and let the regulatory agency run riot.
Justice Douglas's views on private power and administrative government are not the only reasons to question whether the appointment of New Deal lawyers as Justices does much to explain the
relatively favorable reception of the administrative state by the Court
during the 1946-1966 period. By the time that the APA was enacted,
28. See, e.g., DOUGLAS, Go EAST, supra note 17, at 313.

29. Id. at 306; see also id. at 264 (noting that one commissioner had been placed on the SEC
because President Roosevelt had been "under great pressure to name" someone "in order to
'protect' the interests of Wall Street").
30. Id. at 360.
31. Id. at 342-43; see also id. at 343-44 (indicating the opposition to the NIRA by thenSenator and later-Justice Black).
32. ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 74 (1945) (Douglas, J.,dissenting). The majority opinion in
this case was written by a fellow New Deal lawyer, Justice Reed.
33. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 343 U.S. 414, 426 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
34. Id. at 424.
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the Court was a fractured institution. It is true that as FDR's appointees began their tenure on the Court in the late 1930s and early 1940s,
they often agreed with each other and the Administration on the
broad contours of national power. 35 For example, during the 1940
Term, the five FDR appointees on the Court virtually always agreed
on cases that "involved any issue of New Deal power and philosophy. '36 The cases that came before the Court in this period sometimes involved important administrative law issues such as the nondelegation doctrine 37 or judicial deference to an agency's construction
38
of its own statute.
But the last years of the New Deal-that is, those immediately
preceding enactment of the APA-exhibited sharp divisions on the
Court. 39 These divisions became even more pronounced after Presi-

dent Truman succeeded FDR. During the 1946 and 1947 Terms, the
Court decided forty-six cases by votes of five to four, with New Deal
lawyers Douglas and Reed voting alike in only fourteen (thirty percent) of these cases. 40 Moreover, personal bickering on the Court became so severe and occasionally so public that President Truman
reportedly wanted Justices Black, Jackson, Murphy, and Frankfurter
41
to resign.
Much of the disagreement on the Court during the early years of
the APA involved non-administrative law issues such as the applicability against the States of the federal Bill of Rights. 42 However, the
Court also divided at times in deciding important administrative law
35.

See FASSETr, supra note 16, at 263.

36. Id. at 290.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 574-78 (1939). However, this
and other cases of the period often focussed on issues such as the scope of the federal government's Commerce Clause powers and other issues not directly relevant to administrative law.
See FASSETr, supra note 16, at 245-46.

38. See, e.g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941). This very deferential decision was written
by Justice Reed and joined by Justices Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Murphy. See id.
39. See FASSE-r, supra note 16, at 318, 346, 370. Justice Douglas observed that the Court
that included FDR's appointees was "not a 'team.' There were as many divisions within that
group as there likely would have been had nine Presidents named the nine Justices." DOUGLAS,
THE COURT YEARS, supra note 27, at 33.
40. See FASSETT, supra note 16, at 419.

41. See id. at 413. Among the reasons for the bickering on the Court in this period were a
dispute over Justice Black's failure to recuse himself from a case argued by his former law partner and Justice Jackson's apparent bitterness over not being named Chief Justice. See id. at 38083, 405-10; DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, supra note 27, at 28-32. But see EUGENE C. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 287-88 (1958) (contending that Justice

Jackson was not disappointed about not becoming Chief Justice).
42. See, e.g., FASSETr, supra note 16, at 422-24 (discussing Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947)).
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cases. 43 As Professor Merrill himself notes, 44 Justice Jackson (joined
by Justice Frankfurter) dissented from Justice Murphy's opinion for
the Court in SEC v. Chenery Corp.4 5 The dissent denounced the
Court for appearing to approve of "administrative authoritarianism,
this power to decide without law ....",46 Although Justice Jackson
recognized in another case that administrative agencies had become
"indispensable" to modern government, 47 he also warned that they
had "become a veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has
deranged our three-branch legal theories ....,,48 Justice Jackson's
views, and the similar misgivings sometimes expressed by Justice
Douglas, 49 hardly seem to reflect unalloyed confidence in the administrative state on the part of New Deal lawyers.
If the influence of former New Deal insiders on the Court explains relatively little of the apparent acceptance of the administrative
state during Professor Merrill's first period, then alternative explanations are required. One possibility is that judges acquiesced in the
world that the APA created more quickly than did elite lawyers because the judiciary saw itself as a neutral institution that was obligated
to carry out congressional intent. Judicial self-restraint perhaps was
especially important on a Court that was only a decade removed from
the trauma caused by the sharp initial resistance to the New Deal and
the furor over FDR's court-packing plan. 50 While elite lawyers were
free as individuals and in organized groups to fight the administrative
state or to try to shape it to their (and their clients') benefit, judges did
not have such freedom.
Yet this proposed explanation also raises at least one puzzling
irony of its own: if an institutional ethos of fealty to congressional intent helps explain the judiciary's initial acceptance of the administrative state, why did the courts often "tip-toe[ ] around" 51 one aspect of
43. See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
44. Merrill, supra note 2, at 1086.
45. 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (Chenery II). This case and its predecessor, SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80 (1943) (Chenery I), are discussed at length in Professor Zeppos' article in this Symposium. See Zeppos, supra note 1.
46. Chenery 1I, 332 U.S. at 216.
47. FFC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 482 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 487.
49. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
50. See generally Peter L. Strauss, Administrative Law: The Hidden Comparative Law
Course, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 478, 487 (1996) (noting that Congress's creation of "so many agencies was itself a signal of unhappiness with judicial activisim ... which the courts of that time
doubtless understood").
51. Merrill, supra note 2, at 1086.
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the APA, its apparent call for de novo review of questions of law? 52
Section 706 appears to mandate that courts independently interpret
statutes that are involved in administrative law disputes. 53 A consistent plain meaning interpretation of § 706 would have promoted the
judiciary's own authority without sacrificing judicial self-restraint.
However, despite the mandatory language of § 706, courts frequently
have deferred to agencies' interpretations of their own statutes.
Professor Merrill contends that during his initial period, "the
public interest conception of the administrative state" encouraged
courts to give agencies flexibility in making policy. 54 The need for
such flexibility, in turn, presumably helps explain the judicial willingness to side-step congressional intent regarding § 706, although fol55
lowing such intent would have enhanced the authority of the courts.
It seems ironic, however, that an ideology as vague and malleable as
"the public interest" would trump both institutional self-interest and
the ideology of judicial self-restraint in this context, where the two
latter factors could have combined to justify a plain meaning interpretation of § 706. At any rate, the relationship among these factors requires further study.
There is at least one further irony suggested by comparing the
Zeppos and Merrill articles. If elite lawyers fought to keep the emerging administrative state from departing far from the model of the common law courts, 56 then one might expect that judges would prefer that
agencies look as much like Article III courts as possible. Indeed,
many administrative law cases do reflect this preference for adjudica52. See id. at 1085-86 (discussing 5 U.S.C. § 706). This section provides:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions .... The reviewing court shall(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
53. But cf. RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 163
(2d ed. 1994) ("While ... APA §706 leave[s] no doubt about who (court or agency) has the
ultimate authority to interpret statutes, [it] tell[s] us virtually nothing about how
courts ... should interpret statutes.").
54. Merrill, supra note 2, at 1086.
55. Id.
56. See Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1128.
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tory procedures 57 and maximized procedural due process. 58 However,
Richard J. Pierce recently noted that to the extent that judges became
suspicious of administrative government, they were in part reacting to
their experience reviewing New Deal agencies that had relied heavily

on adjudication rather than rulemaking. 59 According to Professor
Pierce, this reliance on adjudication tended to facilitate regulatory
capture by avoiding relatively broad public involvement. 60 And at
least one of the New Deal Justices, William Douglas, shared this pref-

erence for rulemaking over adjudication. 61 So, at least by Professor
Merrill's second period, courts sometimes seemed to prefer that agen-

cies act more like policy-making mini-legislatures and less like imperfect replicas of the judiciary itself.
Professors Zeppos and Merrill both recognize that the forces that
shaped the creation and implementation of the APA cannot be fully

explained by any one theory or intellectual tradition. This comment
on their thought-provoking articles makes no claim to offer a compre-

hensive theory of its own. Rather, it recognizes that, for students of
administrative law, the search for answers can be as rewarding as the

answers themselves.

57. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir.
1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978).
58. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33 (1950), superseded by statute as stated in Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1991); Home
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). But cf. Zeppos,
supra note 1, at 1128-29 ("To the extent the agencies were fairer and 'almost' like courts, it
became more palatable to shift the bulk of work from the courts to the agencies.").
59. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking and the Administrative ProcedureAct, 32 TULSA
L.J. 185, 189 (1996).
60. Id. at 187-88.
61. Id. at 189; see also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 778 (1969) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "[p]ublic airing of problems through rule making makes the bureaucracy
more responsive to public needs"). Even before the passage of the APA, the SEC had sometimes used a type of notice-and-comment rulemaking that Justice Douglas praised for promoting
input by affected parties. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, supra note 17, at 276-77.

